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Abstract
This study examined the relationship between board independence and ﬁrm ﬁnancial
performance, using data of varying sample size (ranging from 89 ﬁrms for regression
to 205 ﬁrms for descriptive analysis) obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange for
the period 1996 through 2004. The key results were that share ownership was highly
concentratedinNigeria,andthisstructuretendedtoengenderboardstructureswithclose
familyafﬁliationsinwhichthechiefexecutiveofﬁcers (CEOs)wereactivemembersof
audit committees. While family afﬁliation of board members was found to support ﬁrm
growth, we found evidence that audit committee membership of chief executives hurt
ﬁrm performance. We also found that foreign chief executives performed better than
their local counterparts. These results suggested the need for Nigerian ﬁrms to adopt
better corporate governance mechanisms in order to make the boards of directors more
independent, avoid unnecessary intervention of CEOs in important committees, and in
that way aid ﬁnancial performance.vi
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1. Background to the study
T
he board of directors has long been recognized as an important corporate governance 
    mechanism for aligning the interests of managers and all stakeholders to a ﬁ  rm. 
    The need to adopt the right corporate governance mechanisms is driven by the 
agency problem and the associated free-rider problem that makes it difﬁ  cult for any 
single investor or stakeholder to bear the cost of monitoring managers. The central role 
of board of directors in this process has therefore been recognized and in recent years has 
gained signiﬁ  cant attraction for at least two reasons. One, both transition countries and other 
developing countries are struggling to attract resources for investment in an increasingly 
competitive global environment. Two, events at Enron and several other large corporations 
suggest the need for policies to promote board independence and other aspects of corporate 
governance. Levine (2004) also sees a link between corporate governance and the economy, 
arguing that it has the capacity to foster economic growth. According to him sound corporate 
governance makes it more likely for owners of capital to monitor the activities of managers 
either directly through voting on crucial matters or indirectly through the board of directors. 
This helps to protect shareholder interest and promote savings, investment and economic 
growth. Oman et al. (2003) argue along similar lines, but see the importance of corporate 
governance on growth through a different channel. For them, well-governed ﬁ  rms are better 
able to raise productivity and aid economic growth. 
Both Oman et al. (2003) and Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that different forms of 
ownership structures are associated with different sets of agency problems. In countries 
such as USA and UK, where share ownership is widely diffused, the agency problem is 
more common between managers and shareholders. In contrast, in developing countries 
characterized by concentrated equity ownership, the agency problem is most predominant 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. As discussed later in this 
study, controlling shareholders acquire and maintain effective control over ﬁ  rms beyond 
what can be justiﬁ  ed by their equity interest, and that they often take advantage of that 
control to expropriate resources from minority shareholders. Developing countries can 
ill afford to maintain structures that perpetuate expropriation of minority shareholders 
since such countries are in need of additional, especially outside, resources to support 
investment and growth. Foreign investors may be scared of such expropriation and 
might well argue for effective control of the ﬁ  rms themselves. However, the political 
backlash such action would unleash could cause political resistance to such levels 
of foreign control. Thus, strengthening board independence and other forms of ﬁ  rm-
level governance is important, and particularly so in developing countries with weak 
institutions that need to attract foreign resources. 2 RESEARCH PAPER 213
Beyondhelpingtoresolveagencyproblemsbetweenmanagersandotherstakeholders,
corporategovernanceisimportanttotheeconomy(Levine,2004;andOmanetal.,2003).
In developing countries with weak legal institutions it is sometimes difﬁcult for foreign
investors to seek legal redress when a developing country partner violates a contractual
agreement (Collier, 2006). Since there are no global law enforcement agencies to deal
with the concomitant problems (Collier, 2006), it could be argued that strengthening
board independence and other ﬁrm-level mechanisms of corporate governance could
helpamelioratetheweakness.Thiswouldencourageforeigninvestment,withsigniﬁcant
ramiﬁcations to the economy.
The issue of board independence and corporate governance in general has long been
neglectedinNigeria.ItwasnotuntilNovember2003thatacodeofcorporategovernance
was developed, which, as discussed below, makes a speciﬁc set of recommendations on
how to promote board independence and corporate governance. The relative neglect of
corporate governance in Nigeria’s public policy is perhaps a reﬂection of the paucity
of research in this area in the country. We know of only two empirical studies on
corporate governance in Nigeria: An unpublished work by Adenikinju and Ayonrinde
(2001) and a study by Sanda et al. (2005). Both studies have important limitations.
While Adenikinju and Ayonrinde (2001) make no attempt to examine the relationship
between board independence and corporate performance, Sanda et al. employ a narrow
set of measures of board independence, reporting no signiﬁcant relationship between
the proportion of outside directors on the board and ﬁrm performance. By employing
a wider set of variables serving as measures of board independence and using a more
recentNigeriandataset,thisreportextendsourunderstandingoftherelationshipbetween
board independence and ﬁrm performance in Nigeria.
Corporategovernanceandthemorespeciﬁcissueofboardindependencehavesuffered
neglect not only in academia as mentioned above, but also in the area of policy. Before
the introduction of a code of corporate governance, there were three main pieces of
legislation that inﬂuenced the operations of enterprises. The ﬁrst is the Companies and
Allied MattersAct 1990 which prescribes the duties and responsibilities of managers of
all limited liability companies. Second, the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 1999
requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate and develop the capital
market,maintainorderlyconduct,transparencyandsanityinthemarketinordertoprotect
investors. Third, the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991 empowers the
Central Bank of Nigeria to register and regulate banks and other ﬁnancial institutions.
This legislation had evident gaps and was not comprehensive in terms of provisions
for corporate governance. Taking note of the deﬁciencies of the existing legislation,
the Securities and Exchange Commission in partnership with the Corporate Affairs
Commission set up in June 2002, a committee to develop a draft code of corporate





ﬁnancial reports. There is a recommendation that the post of CEO should be separated
from that of the chair, unless it is absolutely necessary for the two to be combined, in
which case the code recommends that a strong, non-executive director should serve
as vice-chair of the board. Other provisions of the code related to strengthening boardBOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA 3
independenceincludetherecommendationthatnon-executivedirectorsshouldchairthe
auditcommittee,inadditiontotherequirementthatanon-executivedirectorshouldhave
no business relationship with the ﬁrm.These provisions also include a recommendation
that provides that the non-executive directors should be in the majority, and that a non-
executive director should chair the remuneration committee, the membership of which
should comprise wholly or mainly of outside directors. However, it is observed that
the code is silent about an equally important committee the appointment committee
for gauging board independence. Moreover the code lacks legal authority, as there is
no enforcement mechanism and its observance is entirely voluntary (Nmehielle and
Nwauche,2004).Recognizingthepotentialproblemtoeffectivegovernancethatfamily
afﬁliation of board members could cause, the committee recommended that in order for
the board to be “truly independent, (outside) directors should not be connected with the
immediate family of the members of the management”.
It is apparent from the above that Nigeria’s code of corporate governance does not
take full account of such provisions in codes of corporate governance developed much
earlier in other countries such as the UK and USA. In the USA, the Sarbanes-OxleyAct
2002 heralded the start of new far-reaching measures aimed at strengthening corporate
governance and restoring investor conﬁdence (Jensen and Fuller, 2002). Building on
the progress made in the reports by Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), and Hempel
(1998), in 2003, the UK started to implement the New Combined Code, an outcome of
theCompanyLawreviewandareportbytheHiggsCommittee(2003).Inbothcountries
the new set of regulations has recognized the importance of non-executive directors
and has made special provisions aimed at promoting their independence and corporate
governance.
The main objective of this study was to examine the relationship between measures
of board independence and the ﬁnancial performance of ﬁrms listed in the Nigerian
Stock Exchange (NSE). This broad objective was divided into ﬁve speciﬁc objectives,
one each for the ﬁve measures of board independence:
• To examine whether performance is affected by the extent of family afﬁliation on
the board of directors;
• Toascertaintheextenttowhichﬁrmperformanceisinﬂuencedbythetenureofchief
executive ofﬁcer (CEO);
• To investigate whether there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the proportion of
outside directors on the board and ﬁrm performance;
• To assess the inﬂuence of the audit committee structure on ﬁrm performance.
• To examine the relationship between interlocking directorship and ﬁrm ﬁnancial
performance.
Inlinewiththeaboveobjectives,ﬁvehypothesesweretested.Thehypothesespropose
that there is no signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁrm performance and:
• Family afﬁliation of board of directors;
• CEO tenure;
• Proportion of outside directors on the board;
• Audit committee structure; and,
• Interlocking directorship.
The rest of this report is organized into four sections. Section 2 covers a review
of literature and an overview of the theoretical framework. Section 3 covers the
methodologywhileSection4presentstheresultsofthestudy. Theﬁnalsectionconcludes
the report.4 RESEARCH PAPER 213
2. Literature review
T
he literature on the relation between board independence (as a corporate governance 
    device) and ﬁ  rm performance has registered signiﬁ  cant growth, buoyed mainly by 
    studies from developed, and to a lesser extent some developing, countries. The 
rapid growth in the literature is perhaps motivated by the realization that left to itself, the 
market system does not have the capacity to address the problems of agency. However, 
it is in order to present an overview of what the literature says about the main ways 
in which the market mechanism might help alleviate the agency problem. As Fama 
(1980) argues, the managerial labour market does recognize the current and previous 
performance of every manager and therefore has the capacity to encourage good managers 
who perform well and punish those who do not. This market mechanism provides an 
incentive for managers to promote shareholder wealth and to deter the pursuit of interests 
that may be injurious to the health of the ﬁ  rm. Another market mechanism for dealing 
with the agency problem is through the market for corporate takeover. Managers of 
poorly performing ﬁ  rms run the risk of losing their jobs once the ﬁ  rm is acquired by 
other ﬁ  rms. Fearing this prospect, managers act as a team, each realizing that his or her 
job security is dependent on the performance of every manager in the team. This gives 
each manager the incentive to monitor the behaviour of the other managers in the team. 
Without pre-empting the outcome of the literature review, it may be in order to stress that 
in Nigeria and other developing countries with weak institutional structures, and where 
corruption is endemic, the ability of the market to discipline weak-performing managers 
will be limited. This point is underscored in the work of D’Souza et al. (2001: 6) who 
assert that, “For managers to feel the full disciplining pressure of the capital market, 
the rights of the individual shareholder (particularly the voting rights) must be enforced 
by the country’s legal system”. In view of this, it could be argued that in Nigeria where 
legal institutions are weak, the ability of the capital market to impose the necessary 
disciplinary mechanism will be greatly limited.
Despite the presumed ability of the market to help align the interests of all parties 
interested in the wellbeing of the ﬁ  rm, sporadic cases of corporate malfeasance have 
continued unabated, promoted either by the managers hired to protect the ﬁ  rm, or 
orchestrated by the controlling shareholders. A number of reasons have been given for 
the inability of the market to serve as an effective disciplining device. One, insiders 
know the enterprise better than outsiders. Therefore managers will not allow a takeover 
bid to succeed unless the buyer is ready to pay more than the value of the ﬁ  rm. In order 
to take a decision on whether to raise a bidding, a bidder could bear the personal cost of 
researching the ailing ﬁ  rm. If he raises his bidding, this could send a signal to other bidders 
to raise their own bidding as well. Thus, the market for corporate takeover, designed to 





to fail to discipline them.These are amongst the reasons why it is often claimed that the
market system may not be properly equipped to deal with the agency problem.
Given the weakness of the market system to handle the problem of agency, a
broad spectrum of corporate governance measures have been suggested as effective
mechanisms for promoting corporate performance. This study provides an overview
of these mechanisms, with more detail on these aspects of board independence either
ignored or mentioned brieﬂy in Sanda et al. (2005). The literature surveyed is divided
into two categories: The ﬁrst concerns board characteristics, and the second concerns
other control variables affecting ﬁrm performance.
Board characteristics
T
hree aspects of board characteristics are discussed in this section. We begin with a
review of the literature on board size, followed by that on board composition, and
then on the importance of family domination on the board of directors.
Board size, the total number of directors (including the chairman) on the board, has
been a subject of signiﬁcant research in terms of its relationship with ﬁrm performance.
It is argued that within a certain range, the larger the board, the more effective it is
in its statutory function of monitoring the management. While there may be no one-
size-ﬁts-all recommendation for the optimal size of board, a board size of 10 is often
recommended. Yermack (1996: 186) draws on previous literature to support the need
to “limit the membership of boards to 10 people, with a preferred size of eight or nine”.
However, recent evidence by Sanda et al. (2005) is consistent with a recommendation
for a board size of 10.
Board composition, which refers to the number outside directors, when expressed
as a proportion of total board membership, is a good measure of board composition. A




a special attention to the need to have a reasonable proportion of them on the board of
listedﬁrms.Empiricalevidencehasshownthatproperlyconstitutedboardswiththeright
mixofnon-executivedirectors tendtocontributemoretoperformancethanboardswith
a predominance of inside directors (see, for example, Weisbach, 1988; Fosberg, 1989;
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Mehran, 1995; Yermack, 1996; John and Senbet, 1998;
Bhagat and Black, 2001). A closely related issue is the participation of non-executive
directors on the main committees of the board. John and Senbet (1998) argue in favour
of a committee structure that gives the non-executive directors a key role especially
in the audit, remuneration and appointment committees. This recommendation seems
to be acceptable to policy makers. In Nigeria for example, the new code of corporate
governance provides that the non-executive directors should be in the majority, and that
T
he literature on the relation between board independence (as a corporate governance 
    device) and ﬁ  rm performance has registered signiﬁ  cant growth, buoyed mainly by 
    studies from developed, and to a lesser extent some developing, countries. The 
rapid growth in the literature is perhaps motivated by the realization that left to itself, the 
market system does not have the capacity to address the problems of agency. However, 
it is in order to present an overview of what the literature says about the main ways 
in which the market mechanism might help alleviate the agency problem. As Fama 
(1980) argues, the managerial labour market does recognize the current and previous 
performance of every manager and therefore has the capacity to encourage good managers 
who perform well and punish those who do not. This market mechanism provides an 
incentive for managers to promote shareholder wealth and to deter the pursuit of interests 
that may be injurious to the health of the ﬁ  rm. Another market mechanism for dealing 
with the agency problem is through the market for corporate takeover. Managers of 
poorly performing ﬁ  rms run the risk of losing their jobs once the ﬁ  rm is acquired by 
other ﬁ  rms. Fearing this prospect, managers act as a team, each realizing that his or her 
job security is dependent on the performance of every manager in the team. This gives 
each manager the incentive to monitor the behaviour of the other managers in the team. 
Without pre-empting the outcome of the literature review, it may be in order to stress that 
in Nigeria and other developing countries with weak institutional structures, and where 
corruption is endemic, the ability of the market to discipline weak-performing managers 
will be limited. This point is underscored in the work of D’Souza et al. (2001: 6) who 
assert that, “For managers to feel the full disciplining pressure of the capital market, 
the rights of the individual shareholder (particularly the voting rights) must be enforced 
by the country’s legal system”. In view of this, it could be argued that in Nigeria where 
legal institutions are weak, the ability of the capital market to impose the necessary 
disciplinary mechanism will be greatly limited.
Despite the presumed ability of the market to help align the interests of all parties 
interested in the wellbeing of the ﬁ  rm, sporadic cases of corporate malfeasance have 
continued unabated, promoted either by the managers hired to protect the ﬁ  rm, or 
orchestrated by the controlling shareholders. A number of reasons have been given for 
the inability of the market to serve as an effective disciplining device. One, insiders 
know the enterprise better than outsiders. Therefore managers will not allow a takeover 
bid to succeed unless the buyer is ready to pay more than the value of the ﬁ  rm. In order 
to take a decision on whether to raise a bidding, a bidder could bear the personal cost of 
researching the ailing ﬁ  rm. If he raises his bidding, this could send a signal to other bidders 
to raise their own bidding as well. Thus, the market for corporate takeover, designed to 
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a non-executive director should chair the remuneration committee, the membership
of which should comprise wholly or mainly of outside directors. In a recent empirical
study,Hayesetal.(2004)reportnorelationshipbetweenthefractionofoutsidedirectors
serving on a committee and the performance of the ﬁrm. This ﬁnding runs counter to
the ﬁndings reported in a review by John and Senbet (1998), which supports greater
participation of outside directors on the major committees of the board. However, there
is a distinction between outside directors and independent directors.An outside director
with business interests in the ﬁrm would compromise the independence that one would
expect such an outsider to gain. Thus, only outside directors with no business interest
other than membership of the board are regarded as truly independent.
The results so far have been mixed. As a measure of board independence, the ratio
of outside directors sitting on the board has been found to be closely related to ﬁrm
performance (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; andWade et al., 1990). In contrast to the above,
evidence of a negative relation has also been reported (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996;
Daily and Johnson, 1997; andWeir and Laing, 2001), while some studies have reported
no signiﬁcant relation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; and Bhagat and Black, 2000).
A number of reasons have been advanced to explain the disparate ﬁndings. A key
explanation, perhaps, is the difﬁculty often encountered in the measurement of board
independence and the concomitant differences in the measures of such independence.
While some studies have relied upon CEO turnover following poor performance as a
measure of board independence (Udueni, 1998; Liang and Li, 1999; and Shivdasani
and Yermack, 1999), some have attempted to gauge it using multiple or interlocking
directorships (Gilson, 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; and Shivdasani, 1993), and yet
another group has used the number of outside directors appointed during the tenure of
the CEO as a proxy for board independence (Core et al., 1999; and Ghosh and Sirmans,
2003). Other researchers such as Klein (1998) and Hayes et. al. (2004) have undertaken
studies using as their measure of board independence the fraction of outside directors
serving on each committee (this is often referred to as committee structure). Yet others
have considered the issue of a busy director as one sitting on three or more boards
(Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003). The extent to which the board of directors may serve as an
effective tool for the promotion of board independence depends in part on the extent
to which the members are involved in other assignments. It is assumed that the greater
the number of boards on which a person sits, the less time they will have on a single
board. This assumption has a drawback in the sense that membership of other boards
could enrich experience and widen exposure, both of which could have positive effects
on ﬁrm performance. Despite the potential gains of multiple directorship, the literature
considers as busy a director sitting on three or more boards (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003).
Directors who are too busy are unable to pay attention to strategic issues for effective
governance and discipline of the executives. In the UK, the phenomenon of multiple
directorships has led the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) to call for a
limitation on the number of non-executive directorships an individual can hold at the
same time to not more than ﬁve (Pass, 2004).
A CEO who has family on the board of directors could inﬂict deleterious consequences
for the ﬁrm and its performance. In the face of poor performance it is likely that ﬁrms with
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chief executives. The network of friends and relations on the board could make it difﬁcult
for this to happen. The results obtained from the analysis of variance showed that family
dominated boards tend to have a large number of directors sitting on their boards.
Each of these measures of board independence is fraught with pitfalls. Take the case of
multiple directorships, for example. While persons with track records of performance as
independentdirectorsmightgetappointedtoseveralotherboards,suchmultipleappointments
could thin out the director’s available time for monitoring, reducing the effectiveness of
the board in its monitoring role. Thus the link between multiple directorship and corporate
performance could be a tenuous one.
Asecond methodological issue believed to have contributed to the lack of a coherent
picture is the sampling technique. According to Coles et al. (2004), most studies on
board independence have been conducted on the basis of data from large publicly held
ﬁrms.According to them, for this category of ﬁrms, the link between independence and
ﬁrm performance is not very clear, in contrast to small ﬁrms, for which the link is more
straightforward.
Family control of boards can be gauged by the presence or absence of members of
the same family sitting on a board. It should be clear from the outset that the concern
in this study is whether there are two or more members of the same family sitting on a
board; the concern is not on the extent of family ownership. It is therefore of interest to
examine this strand of literature the effect of family domination on ﬁrm value. Boards
with several members of the same family are less likely to be effective at replacing a
CEO in the event of poor performance especially when such a CEO is a family relation
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998). However, some scholars (such as Tsai et al., 2006)
take exception to the argument that family-controlled boards could engender CEO
entrenchment and therefore serve as a setback to other classes of shareholders. Tsai
et al. (2006) see the impact of family-controlled boards in a more positive light. Their
argumentisthatinafamily-controlledboard,amemberofthefamilyisoftenmotivated
by the bond of family ties to promote organizational, rather than individual, goals, since
the success and continuity of the family business is of paramount importance. Thus,
they reason, family-controlled boards could in fact be more effective than other boards
in mitigating the agency problem and thus aligning the interests of the managers and
shareholders.
However, like other scholars on the subject, Tsai et al. (2006) are not oblivious of
thepossibilitythatfamily-controlledboardsmayprotecttheinterestsofthefamilyeven
when such interests run counter to those of other shareholders. An example of this is
the tendency for such boards to use family connection, rather than performance, as a
basis to extend the tenure of a chief executive. The novelty of the argument by Tsai et
al. (2006) is that it presents a more balanced view of the impact of family-dominated
boards. Indeed, the authors test the two hypotheses using data drawn from listed ﬁrms
in Taiwan. They report evidence in favour of their thesis that compared with other




(2003) have advanced a reason why one should expect family-controlled boards to8 RESEARCH PAPER 213
pursue interests that may hurt minority shareholders. Their argument runs as follows.
In boards without the inﬂuence of family connections, share ownership tends to be
more diffused, limiting each shareholder’s risk to the relatively small investment they
have made in the shares of the ﬁrm. Thus, boards of ﬁrms with diffused ownership are
better able to pursue risky, high return projects, since each shareholder’s risk exposure
is comparatively small. In contrast, family-dominated boards are not characterized by
such diffused ownership the interest of the family is often signiﬁcant. Thus, in order
not to expose the family to signiﬁcant levels of risk, such boards will pursue low-return,
lower risk projects, an objective that may hurt small shareholders. Thus, the conﬂict of
interests between families with signiﬁcant investment and the small shareholders will
continue to prevail, the authors argue. Indeed, Morck and Yeung (2003) buttress this
argument by referring to previous literature that suggests that stock prices tend to rise
on the news of death of a long-tenured CEO.
Although they recognize the importance of devising ways to address the problem of
agency between managers and other stakeholders, Oman et al. (2003), argue that this
problemtendstomanifestitselfindifferentways,dependingonthepatternofownership
structure. In countries such as the UK and the USA where shares are widely diffused,
the traditional manager-owner agency problem tends to be most visible. In contrast, in
many other countries where share ownership is highly concentrated, the most relevant
manifestation of the agency problem is the tendency for controlling shareholders to
expropriate minority shareholders,using a number of strategies such as multiple classes
of shares and pyramidal ownership structures. Such mechanisms enable the controlling
shareholders to have effective control over the ﬁrms in which they have vested interest.
What is more, such schemes enable them to have more control over the ﬁrms than can
be justiﬁed by their ownership control.
Despite the absence of a coherent picture, a number of stylized facts seem to emerge
from the literature. One possible conclusion is that a CEO who performs poorly is more
likely to be replaced than one who performs well (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). A
second empirical tendency is for CEO turnover to be more sensitive to performance
when the board is independent (Liang and Li, 1999). Finally, there is the tendency for
the probability of independent directors being added to the board to rise following poor
ﬁrmperformance,justasboardindependencehasthetendencytodeclineoverthecourse
of a CEO’s tenure (Udueni, 1998).
Other control variables
I
nvestigating the effects of the above characteristics of the board of directors requires
controlling for certain other variables such as ﬁrm size. The size of the ﬁrm is an
important variable that needs to be controlled for in any reduced form regression
involving board characteristics and corporate performance. In fact, this variable has
been controlled for even under different model speciﬁcations. The use of the number of
employees as a control for ﬁrm size and a number of other studies has been reported in
the literature (Bigsten et al., 1997; Mayers et al., 1997; Shivdasani and Yermack 1999;
and Sanda et al., 2005).BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA 9
Ownership concentration is another control variable. It refers to the proportion of
shares controlled by the largest shareholders. Ownership concentration is believed to
enable the controlling shareholders to bear the personal costs of monitoring, and hence
tocontributetowardssolvingtheagencyproblem.However,twoproblemsareassociated
with this. It is often the case that members of the same family might take control of a
signiﬁcant proportion of equity, and even make this control very visible through their
participation as board members. Levine (2004) points out that this could have adverse
consequences not only for the ﬁrm but for the entire economy as well.Where the family
members constitute an important inﬂuence on the board, they can translate their equity
control into actual power.Where such control is spread through their participation in an
array of ﬁrms, their inﬂuence could be so overwhelming as to cause the government to
adopt policies that negate the spirit and letter of private entrepreneurship. The adoption
of policies to protect local industry, and the introduction or maintenance of subsidies
are some of the ways in which such equity control could produce power and cause the
adoption of inappropriate policies. The literature on corporate governance has long
regarded ownership concentration as an important mechanism for ameliorating the
problem of agency (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In many countries, with the notable
exceptionoftheUSAandtheUK,shareownershiptendstoconcentrateinafewfamilies,
posing a new set of challenges for corporate governance.As we learn from Morck and
Yeung (2003), Oman et al. (2003) and others, ownership concentration could instead
be harmful to governance because managers may be hired to protect the interest of
controllingshareholders,oftenwithutterdisregardto,ortothedetrimentof,theinterest
of minority, public shareholders. In view of the debate on the possible implications of
ownership concentration on corporate governance and policy, we examine the patterns
of such concentration in Nigeria.
It is also important to take note of the importance of foreign CEOs as a control
variable.InarecentstudyoncorporategovernanceinNigeria,Sandaetal.(2005)report




gency theory provides the theoretical underpinning upon which the literature on
corporate governance has ﬂourished. The theory states that in the presence of
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or shareholder (Ross, 1973; Fama, 1980). Within the context of the stakeholder theory,
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etc that came in the wake of such high-proﬁle corporate frauds as occurred at Enron,
Global Crossing, Parmalat andWorldcom. Since there are many stakeholders, the agent
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D
ata for the period 1996 through 2004 were obtained from the Abuja and Lagos 
      ofﬁ  ces of the NSE, the Abuja Ofﬁ  ce of the Security and Exchange Commission 
      and from a Lagos-based stockbroking ﬁ  rm. The choice of this period was 
informed by a couple of factors. First, computerization of stock price records started 
after 1995, leaving the researchers to rely on newspapers for stock price information. As 
the project started in 2006, the year 2004 was the latest for which annual reports were 
available. Many ﬁ  rms take at least a year to publish their annual ﬁ  nancial reports. 
For each of the nine years of our study, the Factbook published by the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange was obtained from Abuja Ofﬁ  ce of the NSE. Annual reports and 
accounts of listed ﬁ  rms were obtained from the Lagos ofﬁ  ce of the NSE. The annual 
reports were the source of information on some important variables of interest such as 
director shareholding, board composition, audit committee structure, equity ownership 
concentration and CEO nationality. A major problem encountered in obtaining this sort 
of information from Lagos was that the ofﬁ  ce did not have past annual reports for many 
of the ﬁ  rms listed in the stock exchange for many years of our study. As a result, data 
required for regression analysis were obtained for only 89 ﬁ  rms. To make matters worse, 
some annual reports were unavailable for some years for some of the 89 ﬁ  rms. These 
constraints limited the scope of the sample used for regression analysis. One source of 
consolation, however, is that the 89 ﬁ  rms (see Appendix 1) covered nearly all the sectors 
of the stock exchange, and the major players in the market are represented in the sample. 
(It should be noted however that only regression results are based on this sample; some 
descriptive results are based on all the companies in the NSE). The stockbroking ﬁ  rm 
provided daily stock prices for all listed ﬁ  rms over the period of study. The data were 
then used to compute annual stock returns. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
in Abuja provided access to its annual reports, from which data on price-earning (PE) 
ratios for all listed ﬁ  rms were obtained. 
Variable measurements
T
here are two categories of variables for this study. In the ﬁ  rst category are measures 
    of ﬁ  rm performance: ROA, ROE, PE ratio and stock return; in the second are 
measures of board independence along with some control variables. The measures of 
board independence are: 
stakeholder theory and further suggests that by pursuing the goal of maximizing long-
term value of the ﬁ  rm, managers could serve the interests of all stakeholders. Sanda et 
al. (2005) note that this criterion has not been subjected to empirical veriﬁ  cation.
In a review of the stakeholder theory, John and Senbet (1998) note that the multiplicity 
of principals tends to give rise to conﬂ  icting interests. The authors note the vitality 
of board independence and committee structure as means of overcoming the agency 
problem. They also emphasize the importance of board size, noting that after a point, 
increasing the size of the board could be detrimental to ﬁ  rm performance. 
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• CEO tenure.
• Proportion of outside directors on the board.
• Audit committee structure.
• Interlocking directorship.
• Family afﬁliation of board of directors.
CEO tenure is measured as the number of years the CEO has served on the board.
We therefore expect to include a dummy variable to capture the effect of CEO tenure
and the method of creation of this dummy is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Variables and their measurement
ROA Obtained by expressing net proﬁt as a proportion of total
assets.
ROE Obtained by computing net proﬁt as a proportion of equity
value.
PE ratio Data obtained directly from the Securities and Exchange
Commission so no calculation was performed.
Return Foreachﬁrminthesample,year-on-yearpercentagechange
in stock prices are calculated and used as proxy for stock
return.
Board size The number of directors sitting on the board of a ﬁrm in a
particular ﬁnancial year.
Board size squared A variable created by taking the squares of board size
mentioned above.
Firm size Two measures of ﬁrm size are used. One, the total number
of employees in the ﬁrm is used as a control variable in all
regressions.However,forsomeotherpurposesweusedtotal
assets to deﬁne small ﬁrms as those with total assets below
the average for the market, and large ﬁrms as those with
assets above the average. A dummy variable was therefore
created, taking a value of 0 for large ﬁrms and 1 for small
ones.
Family dummy Some ﬁrms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange have members
of the same family sitting on their boards. Adummy variable
was therefore created, taking a value of 1 for such category
of ﬁrms, and 0 otherwise.
Interlocking directorship Aﬁrmisconsideredashavinganinterlockingdirectorshipifthe
CEO is sitting in other ﬁrms as a non-executive director.
Busy directorship Thenumberofboardroomsinwhichinagivenyearadirector
appears as a member.
Tenure dummy of CEO From the Factbook that gives summary of ﬁnancial reports of
ﬁrms, every CEO makes one or more appearances, ranging
from 1 to 9 in our data. By computing the average number
of such appearances, we created a dummy variable, taking
a value of 0 for CEOs with tenure of less than the average,
and 1 otherwise.
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Table 1: Continued
CEO foreign dummy A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the CEO is foreign
and 0 otherwise.
Ownership concentration dummy The number of controlling shareholders varies from one ﬁrm
to another. To obtain a proxy for ownership concentration,
we divided the proportion of shares owned by the controlling
shareholders by the number of controlling shareholders.
Taking the average for all ﬁrms, we obtained a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 for a ﬁrm falling above the
average, and 0 otherwise.
CEO audit membership dummy Adummy variable taking a value of 1 if the CEO is a member
of the audit committee and 0 otherwise.
Board composition Deﬁned as the number of outside directors as a proportion
of board size.
ROA = return on assets; ROE = return on equity; PE ratio = price-earning ratio.
Methods of analysis
T
wo methods of data analysis were employed and the results were therefore divided
into two to reﬂect this categorization. The ﬁrst type of analysis was descriptive
analysis, which provides some frequencies, averages and where possible comparison
of means (through t-tests). Results based on this method of analysis are presented in
Section 4. The second method of analysis is regression analysis. Given that the data
had both spatial and temporal dimensions, ordinary least squares (OLS) was regarded
as inappropriate, necessitating the adoption of the ﬁxed-effects regression. According
to Yermack (1996: 194) “the ﬁxed-effects framework represents a common, unbiased
method of controlling for omitted variables in a panel data set”.
Model speciﬁcation
A
s shown below, four models were estimated. On the left hand-side are measures of
ﬁrm performance, namely ROA for Equation 1, ROE for Equation 2, PE ratio for
Equation 3 and stock returns for Equation 4.
ROAit = b0 + b1Boardsizeit + b2Boardsizesqit + b3Logﬁrmsizeit + (1)
b4FamilyDummyit + b5CEOTenureDummyit +
b6CEOForeignDummyit + b7OwnconcentDummyit +
b8CEOAudiMemDummy b9BoardCompit +
b10InterlockDirDummyit+ eit
ROEit = b0 + b1Boardsizeit + b2Boardsizesqit + b3Logﬁrmsizeit + (2)
b4FamilyDummyit + b5CEOTenureDummyit +
b6CEOForeignDummyit + b7OwnconcentDummyit +14 RESEARCH PAPER 213
T
wo types of results are presented this section: Descriptive statistics, and results 
    based on regression analysis.
Descriptive statistics
T
he descriptive statistics provided are for the following variables: Board size, patterns 
    of family afﬁ  liations, CEO tenure, busy or interlocking directorship, ownership 
concentration, and audit committee structure. 
As shown in Table 2, although both the number of ﬁ  rms and the number of directors 
increased over time, the average size of the boards of directors has changed little, hovering 
within a narrow range of 8.4 for most of the years and a peak of 8.6 in 1999. 
Table 2: Yearly distribution of directors and average size of board of directors
Year  Number of   Number of ﬁ  rms  Average size 
  directorships  of board  of board
1996  1173  139  8.4
1997  1428  168  8.5
1998  1423  170  8.4
1999  1412  164  8.6
2000  1382  162  8.5
2001  1532  182  8.4
2002  1574  187  8.4
2003  1618  193  8.4
2004  1716  204  8.4
While the overall board size was fairly constant over time, there are considerable 
differences across industries. As shown in Table 3, average size of board has varied widely 
across the different sectors, ranging from a minimum of 6.0 in the maritime sector to a 
peak of 10.6 amongst ﬁ  rms in the breweries sector. 
    b8CEOAudiMemDummy       b9BoardCompit + 
    b10InterlockDirDummyit + eit 
PERATIOit   =  b0 + b1Boardsizeit + b2Boardsizesqit + b3Logﬁ  rmsizeit   +  (3) 
    b4FamilyDummyit   +   b5CEOTenureDummyit   + 
    b6CEOForeignDummyit     +  b7OwnconcentDummyit   + 
    b8CEOAudiMemDummy b9   BoardCompit   + 
    b10InterlockDirDummyit + eit
RETURNit   =  b0 + b1Boardsizeit + b2Boardsizesqit + b3Logﬁ  rmsizeit   +   (4)
    b4FamilyDummyit   +   b5CEOTenureDummyit   + 
    b6CEOForeignDummyit     +   b7OwnconcentDummyit   +
    b8CEOAudiMemDummy       b9BoardCompit   + 
    b10InterlockDirDummyit + b111996Dummyit + b121997Dummyit   +
    b131998Dummyit + b141999Dummyit + b152000Dummyit   +
    b162001Dummyit + b172002Dummyit + b182003Dummyit + eit 
     
A total of 12 regressions were run and reported in this study. The ﬁ  rst four regressions 
involved estimating the above four equations using the entire sample. The second set of 
four regressions was based on the use of data for only large ﬁ  rms to estimate the above 
set of equations. The third and ﬁ  nal set of four regressions utilize data on small ﬁ  rms 
only to estimate the above four equations.
Four measures of ﬁ  rm performance (ROA, ROE, PE ratio and Stock Return) are 
regressed against a set of control variables as well as measures of board independence. 
The control variables are board size (both the linear and quadratic measures of it), ﬁ  rm 
size, measured by the natural logs of number of employees of the ﬁ  rm and four dummy 
variables: The ﬁ  rst, family connection dummy (FamilyDummy), taking a value of 1 
in ﬁ  rms with evidence of family members on the same board; the second CEO tenure 
dummy (CEOTenureDummy) taking a value of 1 in ﬁ  rms with long tenure CEOs; 
the third, Foreign CEO dummy (CEOForeignDummy) taking a value of 1 in ﬁ  rms 
with foreign chief executive ofﬁ  cers; and the fourth, ownership concentration dummy 
(OwnconcentDummy) taking a value of 1 in ﬁ  rms with ownership concentration above 
the mean values. Two measures of board independence are added to the set of regressors. 
The ﬁ  rst is CEO membership of audit committee, which takes a value of 1 in ﬁ  rms where 
the CEO sits on the audit committee. The second measure of board independence is board 
composition, computed by expressing the number of outside directors as a proportion 
of board size. Interlocking directorship is also one of the regressors, aimed at gauging 
whether participation of board members on boards of other listed ﬁ  rms has any signiﬁ  cant 
relation with performance. Finally, year dummies are included in the right-hand-side 
variables of Equation 4, but not for other equations because in those cases we do not 
reject the null hypothesis that the time dummies are not jointly signiﬁ  cant. 
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4. Results
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    based on regression analysis.
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Table 3: Sectoral distribution of directorships
Sector Number of Number of ﬁrms Average
directorships in 2004 board size
Agriculture 385 5 8
Airlines 57 2 6.3
Automobiles 407 6 7.7
Banking 2002 36 9.8
Breweries 603 7 10.6
Building Materials 653 8 9.1
Chemicals & Paints 461 7 7.3
Commercial/Services 82 1 9.1
Computer & Ofﬁce Equipment 390 6 7.2
Conglomerates 718 9 9.2
Construction 389 5 8.4
Emerging Markets 796 17 7.4
Engineering Technology 222 3 8.9
Food/Beverages & Tobacco 1069 13 9.2
Footwear 119 2 7.4
Healthcare 716 11 7.5
Hotel 7 1 7
Industrial/Domestic 797 12 7.8
Insurance 1191 21 7.6
Machinery (Marketing) 180 3 6.7
Managed Funds 57 1 7.1
Maritime 6 1 6
Packaging 537 8 8.4
Petroleum (Marketing) 635 8 9.1
Printing & Publishing 243 4 7.1
Real Estate 49 1 7
Textiles 487 6 9
A second variable requiring closer investigation is family afﬁliation. In Table 4 we
presentthreekindsofinformationinthreepanelsconcerningfamilyrelationsinNigerian
boardrooms. Panel A shows the variations over time in the number of ﬁrms with two
or more members of the same family on their boards. The number of ﬁrms with family
afﬁliation increased over time, from 37 in 1996 to 54 in 2004, and ﬂuctuated in the
intervening period (Table 4). However, when expressed as a proportion of total number
of ﬁrms listed in the NSE, the number of ﬁrms with family relations on their boards
accounted for roughly one-quarter of all ﬁrms, ranging from a minimum of 24.1% in
1998 to a maximum of 27.5% in 2001.
Panel B of the table provides a picture of the actual number of family-afﬁliated
directors on the NSE. In 1996, a total of 87 directors had relatives on the boards of
listed ﬁrms in Nigeria. This accounts for 7.4 % of all directors. Over time, the number
of directors in this category accounted for a stable proportion of all directors, ranging
from 7.2% in 1999 to a maximum of 8.7% in 1997.
In Panel C (Table 4), we present a distribution of ﬁrms by the frequency of family-
afﬁliated directors. Clearly, boards with two members of the same family appear to be
the most common. For example, out of a total of 37 ﬁrms that reported having family-
afﬁliationsintheboardrooms,28hadonlytwomembersofthesamefamilyontheboard.BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA 17
This compares with six ﬁrms for which there were three family members or with two
ﬁrms which had four family members.
Table 4: Family afﬁliation in Nigerian boardrooms
Sector/Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Panel A
Firms with family afﬁliation 37 51 41 41 40 50 49 51 54
Firms in the NSE 139 168 170 164 162 182 187 193 204
Percentage 26.6 30.4 24.1 25 24.7 27.5 26.2 26.4 26.5
Panel B 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Afﬁliated directors 87 124 108 101 99 126 123 130 139
Directors in the NSE 1,173 1,428 1,423 1,412 1,382 1,532 1,574 1,618 1,716
Percentage 7.4 8.7 7.6 7.2 7.2 8.2 7.8 8 8.1
Panel C
No. of afﬁliated directors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
No of Companies
2 28 38 27 30 29 34 34 35 37
3 6 6 6 5 5 8 6 6 7
4 2 6 5 5 5 7 8 9 8
5 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2
The third issue of interest in this section is CEO tenure. From the data set of the
directors, a subset comprising only the CEOs and managing directors was extracted,
giving a total of 410 observations. We computed the number of years each CEO had
stayed in that position. From the results inTable 5 it is clear that most of the CEOs (157
or 38.3%) had spent only a year in the boardroom. Whether those in this category had
abdicated this post is unclear.What is certain is that there were a good number of CEOs
who had retained their positions for fairly long, with about 33% of them holding the
position for four years or longer.
Whether CEOs with long tenure are associated with better-performing ﬁrms was
investigated further by separating the CEOs into two groups. The ﬁrst group had
boardrooms with family members and the second had no evidence of such family
relations.An independent t-test suggested signiﬁcant differences in CEO tenures of the
two categories of ﬁrms. In particular, CEOs in the ﬁrst group (family relations) had held
thepositionforanaverageof3.9years,comparedwiththeaverageof2.91yearsforthose
without a family relation on the board. Do short-tenure CEOs perform better than the
long-tenure ones? This question was investigated using three measures of performance




to suggest that such elongation adds any value by way of better performance.
The fourth variable of interest is busy directorship and the closely related concept of
interlocking directorship. Table 6 shows the results on multiple, or busy directorship.
The results in PanelAof the table indicate that most directors sit on one board and this
proportion changes little across the years.18 RESEARCH PAPER 213
Table 5: CEO tenure











Average CEO tenure in the sample 3.09 years
PanelBofthetableshowsthedistributioninrelativeterms.Thegeneralpictureemerging
from the table is that the proportion of directors sitting on one or two boards ranged
from 97.68% in 2002 to 98.30% in 2000. The proportion of directors sitting on more
than two boards peaked at 2.32% in 2002, compared with the lowest proportion of 1.7%
in 2000.
Table 6: Multiple or busy directorships
PANEL A Frequencies
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 No. of No. of
Directors director-
ships
1996 955 79 16 3 0 0 1053 1173
1997 1127 109 15 7 2 0 1260 1428
1998 1117 107 17 9 1 0 1251 1423
1999 1129 100 18 6 1 0 1254 1412
2000 1111 100 15 4 2 0 1232 1382
2001 1169 132 18 10 1 0 1330 1532
2002 1231 118 23 8 1 0 1381 1574
2003 1249 134 26 3 1 1 1414 1618
2004 1339 137 27 4 0 1 1508 1716
Panel B Relative frequencies
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6
1996 90.69 7.50 1.52 0.28 0.00 0.00
1997 89.44 8.65 1.19 0.56 0.16 0.00
1998 89.29 8.55 1.36 0.72 0.08 0.00
1999 90.03 7.97 1.44 0.48 0.08 0.00
2000 90.18 8.12 1.22 0.32 0.16 0.00
2001 87.89 9.92 1.35 0.75 0.08 0.00
2002 89.14 8.54 1.67 0.58 0.07 0.00
2003 88.33 9.48 1.84 0.21 0.07 0.07
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Closelyrelatedtobusydirectorshipistheconceptofinterlockingdirectorships.There
appears to be wide variations over time in the occurrence of interlocking directorships
in the NSE. The results (not shown in any table), showed that in 1996 two CEOs sat
as directors of companies other than the ones they were spearheading. By 1997 this
number had increased with nine CEOs involved in 21 interlocking directorships. This
level was maintained in 1998, but over the next two years, it underwent a precipitous
decline, falling to ﬁve in 1999 and deteriorated further to two by 2000. Over the three
years to 2003, the number of interlocking directorships increased, rising from seven in
2001 to eight in 2002 and 13 in 2003. By 2004, it declined somewhat, with the number
of interlocking directorships falling to eight by that year. Despite the oscillations in the
frequencies of interlocking directorships during the period of study, there appeared to
be a sluggish upward trend.
Ownership concentration is the next issue of interest. In several important ways, this
study found signiﬁcant concentration of shares in a few hands in Nigeria. To obtain a
ﬁrst measure of ownership concentration, the number of shareholders for each of the
sample companies was obtained. Aggregation of these for all sample ﬁrms, gave an
estimated total of 2.5 million shareholders. Such an aggregation as undertaken here
leads to overestimation of the actual number of shareholders since investors with shares
in more than one company were counted as many times as the number of companies
in which they had equity stakes. Yet, the total number of 2.5 million shareholders is
far lower than Nigeria’s population of 140 million people. To look for other indicators
of ownership concentration, the 90 ﬁrms in the sample were ranked by ownership
concentration. A total of 38 ﬁrms with the most concentrated shareholding structure
reported that between two and 239 individuals controlled more than 70% of all equity.
Wide variations were observed even amongst these ﬁrms. In particular, for 11 of the
ﬁrms, no more than 10 persons were in control of more than 70% of equity. In another
category of ﬁrms with the next most highly concentrated patterns of share ownership
were 14 companies in which more than 70% of equity was controlled by between 11
and 40 persons. This compares with the remaining 13 ﬁrms in which between 41 and
239 individuals exhibited this level of ownership control. We examined the pattern of
director shareholding since this is important in its own right as a corporate governance
tool, but also for its implications on ownership concentration. When they own shares,
directorsrepresentasmallproportionoftotalshareholdersevenincountrieswithhighly
concentrated shareholding structures. Thus, one may consider director shareholding
as a variable related to ownership concentration. Indeed, if directors owned a large
proportionofshares,thiswouldincreaseownershipconcentration(seeSandaetal.,2005
forfurtherinformation).Thisstudyfoundthatdirectorshareholdingwaslow,averaging
12%. Most ﬁrms reported very low levels of director shareholding; a median of 3.3%
was obtained. However, for a quarter of the ﬁrms in the sample, directors owned more
than 14.5% of shares.
The ﬁnal variable of interest in this section is audit committee structure. Our
results showed that three elements of audit committee structure seemed to weaken the
independence of such committees. First, the CEO was a member of the audit committee
innearly30%oftheﬁrms.Second,eveninﬁrmsinwhichtheCEOwasnotamemberof
the committee, there was a preponderance of executive directors (who typically may be20 RESEARCH PAPER 213
subservient to the CEO) on audit committees.The data indicate that executive directors
were in the majority in 47.5% of the ﬁrms, compared with 28.8% and 23.8% of cases in
whichtheywereinparitywithorwereoutnumberedbyothermembersofthecommittee,
respectively.Finally,CEOmembershipinauditcommitteesincreasedthepredominance
of executive directors on such committees.An independent t-test, which grouped ﬁrms
into whether the CEO was a member of the audit committee, showed that at 1% level,
ﬁrms in which a CEO was a member, had a signiﬁcantly larger proportion of executive
directors on the committee, compared with other ﬁrms. In sum, CEOs and executive
directors dominated audit committees, and it would appear that other members of the
board of directors did not make similar appearances on the committees. This suggests
that audit committees, as they are commonly constituted in Nigerian listed ﬁrms, tend
to exhibit features that may impede their independence from the management of the
ﬁrms. Moreover, these features do not conform with the provisions of Cadbury (1992),
Greenbury (1995) or Higgs (2003) for the UK or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) for
the USA.
Regression results Fixed effects models
T
he regression results are presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9. As shown in these three
tables,anumberofvariableshadsigniﬁcantcoefﬁcientestimates.Theywere:Board
size,boardsizesquared,ﬁrmsize,familydummy,tenuredummy,CEOforeigndummy,
CEO audit membership, board composition and year dummies. We discuss the results
on these variables in turn.
From the results in Table 7, the family connection dummy had positive signs in all
the four speciﬁcations, but was signiﬁcant in two of them. This seems to indicate that
for Nigerian ﬁrms, family afﬁliation of board members is good for ﬁrm performance.
Thisconclusiondoesnotchangewhetherregressionisappliedonlytolargeﬁrms(Table
8) or for small ones (Table 9).
TheCEOtenurevariablehadsigniﬁcantpositivesignsintwooutoffourspeciﬁcations
(Table 7). This suggested that CEO experience tends to make positive contribution to
ﬁrm performance.This conclusion was upheld for both large (Table 8) and small (Table
9) ﬁrms.
CEO nationality (a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for foreign CEOs and 0
otherwise)hadpositiveandsigniﬁcantcoefﬁcientestimatesintwooffourspeciﬁcations
in Table 7. The same variable had a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient estimate in one
speciﬁcation (for large ﬁrms, in Table 8) and two for small ﬁrms (in Table 9). These
results suggest that ﬁrms tend to register better performance if the CEO is a foreigner.
CEOauditmembershiphadanegativecoefﬁcientestimateinallthefourspeciﬁcations
and was signiﬁcant in one of them (Table 7). However, when the data were split and
separate regressions run for large and small ﬁrms, the signs of the coefﬁcient estimates
tendedtowander,withamixtureofpositiveandnegativesignsforbothlarge(Table8)and
small (Table 9) ﬁrms. Wherever the variable was signiﬁcant, however, it had a negative
coefﬁcient estimate (Tables 7, 8 and 9). These results suggest that CEO membership of
the audit committee hampered ﬁrm performance.BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA 21
Boardcompositionexhibitedapositivecoefﬁcientestimateinallbutonespeciﬁcation
in Tables 7, 8 and 9. The variable had a signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient estimate in
each of the three tables, suggesting that outside directors made a positive contribution
to ﬁrm performance.
Interlocking directorship presented a rather mixed picture.As seen inTable 7 for the
entire sample, this variable showed no signiﬁcant relationship with ﬁrm performance.




of other ﬁrms, since that could hurt the performance of ﬁrms in which they serve as
chief executives. For small ﬁrms, CEO directorship of other ﬁrms could actually help
improve the performance of the ﬁrms of which they serve as CEOs.
Where the time dummies appeared as regressors, the results showed that they had a
signiﬁcantnegativesign.Sinceadummyvariablewascreatedforeachoftheyears1996
through2003,andnonewascreatedfor2004(toavoidthewell-knowndummy-variable
trap), negative coefﬁcient estimates on the time dummies could be a reﬂection of better
macroeconomic performance of Nigeria in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the new millennium
compared with the late 1990s.22 RESEARCH PAPER 213
5. Conclusion
T
his study investigated the relationship between ﬁ  rm performance and a number of 
    proxies for board independence. For the period 1996 to 2004, we provided 
    descriptive statistics for all the ﬁ  rms listed on the NSE, and ran ﬁ  xed effects 
regressions for 89 ﬁ  rms for which the relevant data required for regression were 
available. Our results showed that certain measures of board independence (such as 
board composition, CEO tenure, family ownership and CEO nationality) had signiﬁ  cant 
positive effect on ﬁ  rm performance. They also showed that while CEO membership 
of audit committees hurt ﬁ  rm performance, interlocking directorship tended to help 
performance of small ﬁ  rms, but hurt that of large ones.
These results have important implications for policy in Nigeria. One major implication 
is that foreign investors through the actions of foreign chief executives resident in 
Nigeria do contribute to the performance of Nigerian ﬁ  rms. The country therefore needs 
to strengthen policies to improve ﬁ  rm-level corporate governance in order to attract 
such investors and bolster overall growth. The regulatory authorities in Nigeria need to 
strengthen the independence of board of directors by, for example, ensuring that CEOs 
are not members of audit committees since there is evidence that such membership is 
injurious to the performance of a ﬁ  rm. 
A word of caution: Our study leaves many questions unanswered. One of these is 
whether Nigerian ﬁ  rms are afﬂ  icted with expropriation of minority shareholders. A related 
unknown issue is whether there is a bi-directional causality in which board independence 
is both the cause and consequence of ﬁ  rm performance. There is also a concern that our 
approach did not take into account the endogeneity problems associated with family 
ownership. These issues are potential areas for further empirical scrutiny.
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Appendix 1: List of ﬁrms for which
data was available for
regression analysis
7-Up Bottling Company Plc.
Academy Press Plc.
Access Bank Nigeria Plc
Acen Insurance Company Plc
Aluminium Manufacturing Company Plc.
Aviation Development Co. Plc
Avon Crowncaps & Containers Plc.
B. O. C. Gases Plc.
BCN Plc.
Benue Cement Company Plc.
Berger Paints Plc.
Beta Glass Company Plc.
C & I Leasing Plc.
Cadbury Nigeria Plc.
CAP Plc.
Cement Company of North (Nigeria) Plc.
CFAO (Nigeria) Plc.
Conoil Plc.












First Bank of Nigeria Plc
Flour Mills (Nigeria) Plc.
Glaxo SmithKline Beecham Consumer Nigeria Plc.
Guaranty Trust Bank Plc
continued next page
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Appendix 1: Continued
Guinea Insurance Plc
Guinness (Nigeria) Breweries Plc
Hallmark Paper Products Plc
Inland Bank (Nigeria) Plc
Intercontinental Bank Plc
John Holt Plc.
Law Union & Rock Insurance Plc
Liberty Bank Plc
LinkageAssurance Plc.




May & Baker Nigeria Plc









Nigerian Bottling Company Plc
Northern (Nigeria) Flour Mills Plc
Oando Nigeria Plc
Omega Bank Plc
P S Mandrides & Company Plc
Pharma-Deko Plc






The Okomu Oil Palm Plc
Thomas Wyatt (Nigeria) Plc
Total Nigeria Plc









Union Bank of Nigeria Plc
Union Ventures & Petroleum Plc
Universal Trust Bank Plc
University Press Plc
UTC (Nigeria) Plc




WestAfrican Providence Insurance Company Plc.BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA 29
Table 7: Regression results: Whole sample
Measures of ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance
2 3 4 5
Independent variable ROA ROE PERATIO Stock
Return
Board size 0.107 -0.087 3.629 -0.004
(1.18) (-0.21) (2.14)** (-0.06)
Board size squared -0.006 0.002 -0.196 0.0001
(-1.39) (0.07) (-2.46)** (0.04)
Log of No. of employees (ﬁrm size) 0.015 0.337 0.527 0.020
(1.05) (1.96)* (0.92) (0.83)
Family dummy 0.077 2.735 6.689 -0.051
(0.10) (2.57)** (3.02)*** (-0.36)
Tenure dummy of CEO -0.060 0.654 -0.025 0.858
(-0.63) (1.99)** (-0.01) (2.02)**
CEO foreign dummy 0.166 3.052 -0.412 0.079
(2.61)*** (5.20)*** (-0.25) (1.41)
Ownership concentration dummy -0.058 0.369 -0.568 0.065
(-1.00) (1.05) (-0.37) (1.60)
CEO audit membership dummy -0.025 -0.612 -1.498 -0.045
(-0.44) (-1.66)* (-1.10) (-0.99)
Board composition 0.127 3.610 5.108 0.060
(1.01) (3.62)*** (1.09) (0.44)
Interlocking directorship -0.049 0.334 -0.335 0.003

















R2 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.20
F 4.98*** 6.24*** 2.67*** 6.76***
N 348 331 322 37130 RESEARCH PAPER 213
Table 8: Regression results: Large ﬁrms
Measures of ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance
2 3 4 5
Independent variable ROA ROE PERATIO Stock
Return
Board size 0.441 0.583 3.579 0.001
(1.77)* (1.66)* (1.18) (0.01)
Board size squared -0.026 -0.039 -0.192 -0.0004
(-1.90)* (-1.99)** (-1.20) (-0.08)
Log of No. of employees (ﬁrm size) 0.244 0.374 -1.147 0.002
(2.04)** (1.25) (-0.79) (0.03)
Family dummy 0.624 2.550 6.699 -0.187
(2.07)** (2.14)** (1.60) (-1.02)
Tenure dummy of CEO -0.183 0.858 2.357 0.186
(-1.09) (2.32)** (1.07) (2.43)**
CEO foreign dummy 0.211 2.600 -1.019 0.145
(1.05) (2.82)*** (-0.43) (1.41)
Ownership concentration dummy -0.350 -0.500 -0.960 -0.031
(-2.30)** (-1.50) (-0.49) (-0.43)
CEO audit membership dummy 0.017 0.080 -2.382 0.016
(0.16) (0.19) (-1.14) (0.21)
Board composition 0.003 1.995 16.004 0.134
(0.01) (1.46) (2.24)** (0.72)
Interlocking directorship -0.125 -0.647 2.716 0.024

















R2 0.17 0.26 0.10 0.30
F 2.48*** 2.07** 4.93*** 4.75***
N 153 142 140 149
Variable deﬁnition is same as indicated in Table 7. The only difference from Table 7 is that the regression
procedure is applied only to the large ﬁrms ﬁrms with total assets above the average for the entire
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Table 9: Regression results: Small ﬁrms
Measures of ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance
2 3 4 5
Independent variable ROA ROE PERATIO Stock
Return
Board size -0.046 -1.169 4.929 0.113
(-1.02) (-1.34) (1.19) (0.93)
Board size squared 0.001 0.061 -0.256 -0.006
(0.74) (1.44) (-1.40) (-0.92)
Log of No. of employees (ﬁrm size) 0.008 0.203 0.430 0.022
(0.63) (1.03) (0.59) (0.56)
Family dummy 0.095 3.727 2.525 0.099
(1.00) (2.34)** (0.59) (0.49)
Tenure dummy of CEO 0.100 0.404 -3.450 0.056
(2.59)*** (0.76) (-0.93) (0.65)
CEO foreign dummy 0.159 3.281* 0.571 0.050
(4.25)*** (4.26)** (0.22) (0.51)
Ownership concentration dummy 0.103 1.415 -1.680 0.137
(2.96)*** (2.42)** (-0.65) (1.60)
CEO audit membership dummy -0.028 -1.216 0.959 -0.040
(-0.86) (-1.82)* (0.42) (-0.47)
Board composition 0.073( 5.575 -5.205 0.252
0.58) (3.78)*** (-0.97) (0.86)
Interlocking directorship 0.006 1.712* -3.846 0.097

















R2 0.20 0.29 0.05 0.23
F 6.89*** 6.61*** 2.06** 3.69***
N 195 189 160 144
Variable deﬁnition is same as indicated in Table 7. The only difference from Table 7 is that the regression
procedure is applied only to the small ﬁrms ﬁrm s with total assets below the average for the entire
sample.32 RESEARCH PAPER 213
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